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¶1  The United Nations has hired private military/security companies (PMSCs)1 to 
provide security services since at least the Somalian Civil War, when it deployed 7,000 
Ghurka guards from Defense Systems Limited to protect relief convoys.2 According to a 
Global Policy Forum report, U.N. spending on outsourcing security services rose from 
$44 million in 2009 to $76 million in 2010.3 PMSCs may be used in peacekeeping 
operations in a variety of roles, including “police and military training and capacity 
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1 While terminology varies, this paper follows the Montreux document in defining PMSCs as private 
business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe 
themselves. Military and security services include, in particular, armed guarding and protection of persons 
and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; 
prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel. Int’l Comm. of the Red 
Cross, Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States 
related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict (Sept. 17, 2008). 
For more information on state practices with PMSCs, see generally Swiss Fed. Dep’t of Foreign Affairs, 
The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies: Proceedings of the Regional 
Workshop for North East and Central Asia, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 
available at http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/The-Montreux-Document-on-Private-Military-and-Security- 
Companies-Proceedings-of-the-Regional-Workshop-for-North-East-and-Central-Asia. This definition is 
meant to encompass what other scholars call private security companies, private military firms, the private 
security industry, private contractors, private armies, privatized armies, private military corporation or 
firms, private military contractors, military service providers, non-lethal service providers, corporate 
security firms, and in some cases, mercenaries. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER KINSEY, CORPORATE SOLDIERS AND 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: THE RISE OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES (2006); Renée De Nevers, Private 
Security Companies and the Laws of War, 40 SECURITY DIALOGUE 169, 173 (2009); Todd S. Milliard, 
Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private Military Companies, 
176 MIL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2003). As will be made clear, it is improper to call PMSCs used in peacekeeping 
operations “mercenaries.” 
2 LOU PINGEOT, DANGEROUS PARTNERSHIP: PRIVATE MILITARY & SECURITY COMPANIES AND THE UN 22 
(2012), available at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPF_Dangerous_Partnership_Full_report.pdf. 
3 Id. at 23 and 45. 
4 U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights [hereinafter OHCHR], Working Group 






2012, the U.N. Department of Safety and Security issued a set of formal guidelines 
through which PMSCs may be hired to provide security services to the U.N.5 
Nonetheless, the U.N. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, originally formed in 
2005 to study “the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding 
the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination,”6 warned that “there is a risk 
that, without proper standards and oversight, the outsourcing of security functions by the 
United Nations to private companies could have a negative effect on the image and 
effectiveness of the United Nations in the field.”7 
¶2  Other scholars have discussed the practical issues involved in using PMSCs in U.N. 
peace operations. While some attempted to highlight the benefits of using PMSCs as part 
of U.N. operations in comparison with the voluntary system of troop contribution by 
U.N. Member States.8 Still others highlighted the effectiveness of these companies in 
assisting with U.N. operations.9 The increased reliance by the U.N. on PMSCs has 
 
on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right 
of Peoples to Self-Determination, Summary Report of the Expert Panel on the Use of Private Military and 
Security Companies by the United Nations, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. A/68/455 (July 31, 2013). 
5 See U.N. Dep’t of Safety and Security, Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from Private 
Security Companies (2012), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/StudyPMSC/GuidelinesOnUseOfArmedSecurit 
yServices.pdf. According to these guidelines, in order for a PMSC to be hired by the U.N., it must: 
a. Be a member of International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC); 
b. Have been in the business of providing armed security services for at least five years; 
c. Be licensed to provide security services by the state in which it is registered or incorporated; 
d. Be licensed to provide security services and to carry and use firearms and ammunition by the state 
in which it will operate; 
e. Have started the registration process to be a registered United Nations Procurement Division 
vendor; and 
f. Be able to substantially comply with the scope of work. 
Id. at 6. 
6 OHCHR Res. 2005/2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/2, at 1 (Apr. 7, 2005). In 2008, the U.N. Human 
Rights Council extended its mandate for three years and instructed it, among other things, “to monitor and 
study the effects on the enjoyment of human rights, particularly the right of peoples to self-determination, 
of the activities of private companies offering military assistance, consultancy and security services on the 
international market and to prepare a draft of international basic principles that encourage respect for 
human rights by those companies in their activities.” Human Rights Council Res. 7/21, Mandate of the 
Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the 
Exercise of the Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination, 7th Sess., March 28, 2008, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/7/21 (Mar. 28, 2008). 
7 U.N. Doc. A/68/339 (20 August 2013). See also Concept Note, Expert Panel Event on the Use of Private 
Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) by the United Nations, (July 31, 2013), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/mercenaries/wg/studypmsc/expertpanelconceptnote.pdf. 
8 See Oldrich Bures, Private Military Companies: A Second Best Peacekeeping Option?, 12 INT’L 
PEACEKEEPING 533 (2005). See also Peter H Gantz, The Private Sector’s Role in Peacekeeping and Peace 
Enforcement, REFUGEES INT’L (Nov. 18, 2003), 
http://www.sandline.com/hotlinks/Refugees_InternationalC3FF13.html; PETER W. SINGER, CORPORATE 
WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY (2008). 
9 See Ian Murphy, Private Military Companies, Peacekeeping, and African States: A Critical Analysis of 
PMCs in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa, (July 2010) (Ph.D. thesis, University of Plymouth). See also 
James Pattison, Outsourcing the Responsibility to Protect: Humanitarian Intervention and Private Military 
and Security Companies, 2 INT’L THEORY 1, 2010, 
http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1752971909990224; PINGEOT, supra note 2. 






encouraged some to suggest using them as front-line peacekeepers.10 However, others 
question this view and argue that PMSCs cannot be hired by the U.N. as peacekeepers.11 
¶3  What has received less attention, however, is the legal status of the employees of 
PMSCs hired by the U.N. This paper analyzes the legal status of PMSC personnel 
participating in U.N. peacekeeping. In other words, how can the personnel of private 
companies be categorized when they are used as peacekeepers? 
¶4  The outsourcing of military and security services used in U.N. peacekeeping 
operations to PMSCs creates a gray area in international law. Under international 
humanitarian law, sometimes called the law of war, peacekeepers who engage in military 
operations are either civilians engaged in lawful self-defense or unlawful combatants. 
Conversely, the various international conventions that govern peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement operations grant peacekeepers the rights of combatants. This tension 
becomes more acute when PMSCs are utilized, both when they are employed by a 
Member State and seconded to the U.N., and when they are employed directly by the U.N. 
itself. The secondment of PMSCs means that a State hires a PMSC and send it to the U.N. 
to be under its disposal. PMSCs seconded to the U.N. would likely not qualify as 
peacekeepers under the U.N.’s peacekeeping conventions, while the protections afforded 
to peacekeepers (such as immunity from local prosecution) seem inappropriate regarding 
PMSCs hired directly by the U.N. In particular, while PMSCs employed in peacekeeping 
operations would not satisfy the technical criteria of mercenaries under the law of war, the 
protections afforded to peacekeepers assume that peacekeeping forces are subject to the 
domestic justice system of a Member State, which would not be the case with those 
employed directly by the U.N. This tension seems ineluctable given the current structure 




I.  THE INCREASING ROLE OF PMSCS IN U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
 
¶5  While PMSCs are not currently used as front-line peacekeepers, they are used in 
various support capacities on peacekeeping missions. Before addressing the legal 
consequences that would follow should their role evolve to include actual peacekeeping, 
this paper will describe their current role and arguments in favor of giving them greater 
responsibilities. 
10 See Bures, supra note 8, at 540-543. See also CHRISTOPHER M. ROCHESTER, A PRIVATE ALTERNATIVE TO 
A STANDING UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE (2007); Malcolm Patterson, A Corporate Alternative to 
United Nations ad hoc Military Deployments, 13 J. CONFLICT SECURITY LAW 215, 221 (2008). 
11 See The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, UN Use of Private Military and 
Security Companies: Practices and Policies (2011) (by Åse G Østensen), available at 
http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/UN-Use-of-Private-Military-and-Security-Companies-Practices-and- 
Policies. See also Christopher Spearin, UN Peacekeeping and the International Private Military and 
Security Industry, 18 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 196, 198 (2011).





A.  The Structure of Peacekeeping Operations in General 
 
¶6 Peacekeeping12 is one way in which the U.N. Security Council and the 
U.N. General Assembly maintain and restore international peace and security.13 
Peacekeeping forces are voluntarily provided by U.N. Member States.14 When the 
Security Council decides to create a peacekeeping mission, the Secretary-General of the 
U.N. asks Member States to participate by seconding national troops to act as U.N. 
forces. The relationship between the Member State seconding its troops and the U.N. is 
governed by a formal agreement, an example of which would be the Model Agreement 
between the U.N. and Member States Contributing Personnel and Equipment to United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations.15 
¶7  U.N. peacekeeping forces are considered to be subsidiary organs of the U.N.16 
They thus enjoy the status, privileges, and immunities set forth in Article 105 of the U.N. 
Charter and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.17 
Although these troops serve under the U.N. flag, they wear their 
countries’ military uniform and are identified as U.N. peacekeepers only by a blue helmet 
or beret and a badge.18 The main nature of U.N. peacekeeping forces is military, although 
civilians and police are also part of them.19 These forces are under the command of the 
Secretary-General, who has the responsibility of directing and exerting day-to-day 
control over the U.N. forces and selecting force commanders.20 In addition to instructions 
from U.N. force commanders, peacekeeping forces may receive orders from the heads of 
their national contingents, which have the ultimate responsibility for disciplining their 
forces.21 
B.   The Current Role of PMSCs in Peacekeeping 
 
¶8  The majority of those who promote the participation of PMSCs in U.N. missions 
highlight the inadequate coordination, training, and equipment of traditional U.N. forces 
 
12 This paper will not address the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations 
thematically, as that distinction is largely irrelevant to its primary purpose. The distinction will be noted 
where relevant. 
13 Marrack Goulding, The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping, 69 INT’L AFFAIRS 451, 451-452 
(1993). 
14 U.N. Dep’t of Peacekeeping Operations & Dep’t of Field Support, United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations Principles and Guidelines 52 (2008), available at 
http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf. 
15 U.N. Secretary-General, Model Agreement between the United Nations and Member States Contributing 
Personnel and Equipment to United Nations Peace-Keeping Operation, U.N. Doc. A/46/185 (May 23, 
1991). 
16 Ray Murphy, United Nations Military Operations and International Humanitarian Law: What Rules 
Apply to Peacekeepers?, 14 CRIM. L.F. 153, 159 (2003). 
17 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15 
(entered into force 17 September 1946). 
18   U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 15; See also U.N. Secretary-General, Model Status of Force 
Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations, 47(b), U.N. Doc. A/45/594 (Oct. 9, 1990).There have been 67 
peacekeeping operations since 1948; as of March 31, 2013, there were 14 peacekeeping operations 
throughout the world. U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet (March 31, 2013), 
https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/bnote0313.pdf. 
19 Jaume Saura, Lawful Peacekeeping: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations, 58 HASTINGS L. J. 479, 486 (2007). 
20 Brian D. Tittemore, Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian Law to United 
Nations Peace Operations 33 STAN. J. INT’L L. 61, 79 (1997). 
21 Id. at 80. 






and claim that these weaknesses can be overcome by the use of PMSCs.22 Even apart 
from the calls for PMSCs, international aid organizations assert that the current U.N. 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement system is weak and does not fulfill its mandated 
purpose.23 
¶9  One of the important reasons for the weakness of U.N. forces is the reluctance of 
Western countries to second their troops to the U.N.24 At times, countries such as the 
U.S. and France have refused to participate in particular U.N. missions altogether, as 
happened, for example, when the U.S. declined to participate in the Liberia mission.25 
Even when developed states do contribute personnel to U.N. missions, they do so to a 
markedly lower degree than developing countries. In February 2014, for instance, the 
U.S. had assigned only 121 troops to peacekeeping missions, Germany, 263 troops, and 
the U.K., 283 troops.26 
¶10  The majority of U.N. peacekeeping operations consist of troops that are not 
provided with sufficient training or equipment. According to statistics provided by the 
U.N. Peacekeeping Department, the majority of peacekeeping forces are provided by 
developing countries. During the period mentioned above, February 2014, the 
participation of troops from developing countries greatly outweighed that of developed 
countries. For example, Bangladesh provided 7,929 troops, Ethiopia, 6,615, and Pakistan, 
8,266.27 Most developing countries are motivated by the desire to give their troops 
income and experience when sending their troops to participate in U.N. operations.28 As a 
result, U.N. troops are not qualified to stop even routine violence. This is clearly 
exemplified by the weakness of U.N. forces in Sierra Leone, where international forces 
were unable to face the rebels.29 
¶11  The U.N. consequently believes that its peacekeeping operations face serious 
challenges relating to the supply of necessary troops. Ban Ki-Moon, the U.N. Secretary- 
General, has stated that “[t]oday we face mounting difficulties in getting enough troops, 
the right equipment and adequate logistical support,” and that “[s]upply has not kept 
pace with demand.”30 
¶12  In response to these deficiencies, various scholars hold PMSCs to be the best 
alternative to classical U.N. forces. These companies are more efficient than 
multinational forces in terms of organization, training, equipment, willingness, and 
overall readiness.31 Others emphasize the financial aspect of PMSC participation in U.N. 
operations. By some estimates, comparable missions using PMSCs could cost 10 percent 
less than those currently staffed with multinational forces.32 
 
22 See ROCHESTER, supra note 10; see also Patterson, supra note 10. 
23 Gantz, supra note 8, at 1. 
24 Pattison, supra note 9, at 2. 
25 Gantz, supra note 8, at 1. 
26 U.N. Dep’t of Peacekeeping Operations, Contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Feb. 
28, 2014), http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2014/feb14_1.pdf. 
27 Id. 
28 Bures, supra note 8 at 542; see Gantz, supra note 8. 
29 See Gantz, supra note 8, at 1. 
30 U.N. News Centre, UN to Strengthen Peacekeeping Efforts Amid Rising Demand, Says Ban (July 7, 
2009), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=31383&amp;Cr=Secretary- 
general&amp;Cr1=peacekeeping. 
31 Spearin, supra note 11 at 197. 
32 E.g., Ian Bruce, UN Should Pay Mercenaries to Keep Peace (Dec. 3, 2006), HERALD, 






¶13  The U.N. has already contracted with many PMSCs to supply services such as 
advice, training, de-mining, logistics, etc.33 For example, the U.N. contracted with 
Pacific Architects and Engineers to provide the U.N. missions in Haiti and Liberia with 
military and security services.34 The U.N. has already hired PMSCs to provide services 
concerning humanitarian assistance and relief, transport, and infrastructure 
developments.35 It is suggested that there must be no difference regarding the outsourcing 
of security-enforcement requirements, including peacekeeping, to PMSCs.36 
¶14  Peter W. Singer suggests three situations in which PMSCs might be used in the 
context of peacekeeping operations. The first involves hiring private companies to secure 
relief operations. The second situation is the use of PMSCs as a “rapid reaction force” 
when U.N. “blue helmets” are unable or unwilling to provide the necessary muscle to 
fulfill the peacekeeping mandate. The third possibility would be to outsource the entire 
peacekeeping operation to private companies. The last option in particular was 
considered by the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping and the U.S. National Security 
Council during the refugee crisis in what was then Zaire in 1996.37 
¶15  To sum up, it is clear that there is a considerable increase in the use of PMSCs to 
provide security services to the U.N. Although the U.N. has not yet delegated 
peacekeeping missions directly to PMSCs, they have been used to provide military and 
security services to peacekeeping forces. Additionally, as will be elaborated later,38 the 
U.S. explicitly uses them in place of its own forces in U.N. peacekeeping operations. 




II. THE LEGAL STATUS OF PEACEKEEPERS 
 
¶16  The complicated legal status of PMSCs utilized in peacekeeping operations is in 
part a reflection of the complicated status of peacekeepers in general. Peacekeepers are 
classified differently depending on whether one consults international humanitarian law 
or the various international conventions that govern peacekeeping operations. 
¶17  As a preliminary matter, one might contest whether international humanitarian law 
is applicable to the U.N. at all. This question was confronted to some extent during early 
U.N. operations, such as in Korea.39 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
 
http://platform.blogs.com/passionofthepresent/2006/12/un_should_pay_m.html. 
33 Østensen, supra note 11, at 11. 
34 FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES: OPTIONS FOR REGULATION, 
2001-2, H.C. 557, at 19 (U.K.). 
35 Kevin A. O'Brien, Military-Advisory Groups and African Security: Privatized Peacekeeping?, 5 INT’L 
PEACEKEEPING 78, 99 (1998). 
36 Id. 
37 Peter W. Singer, Peacekeepers, Inc., POLICY REVIEW (June 2003), available at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/pmscs/51272-peacekeeping-inc-.html?itemid=id. 
38 Infra Part IV.B. 
39 Christopher Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations, 1 
Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN LAW 3 (1998); Walter G. Sharp, Protecting the Avatars of International 
Peace and Security, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 93 (1996); Umesh Palwankar, Applicability of 
International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace-keeping Forces, 33 I.R.R.C. 227 (1993); Torsten 
S. Saarbrücken, Arts 36-38, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 694 (Bruno 
Simma et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2002); R. SIMMONDS, LEGAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE UNITED NATIONS 
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE CONGO 168 (1968). 






has considered the U.N. to be “a subject of international law and capable of possessing 
international rights and duties.”40 This refers to all the rules of international law, 
including international humanitarian law.41 Respect for international humanitarian law by 
U.N. forces is also mandated by the status of forces agreements entered into between the 
U.N. and the State receiving a peacekeeping mission.42 Both the Secretary-General’s 
Bulletin on Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law43 
and the Report of the Panel on the U.N. Peace Operations44 declare that international 
humanitarian law applies to U.N. forces. 
¶18  Aside from some technicalities,45 the main argument against applying international 
humanitarian law to U.N. peacekeeping forces stems from the fact that the U.N. does not 
have any criminal justice system; thus, it cannot fulfill the obligations of a state to 
prosecute those of its armed forces who commit violations of international humanitarian 
law.46 Members of U.N. peacekeeping forces have committed considerable violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law, including torture, sexual violence, and 
attacks on civilians in Somalia, Congo, Haiti, Mozambique, East Timor, Bosnia, Kosovo, 
and Cambodia.47 
¶19  Yet this is not a problem when U.N. missions comprise traditional, multinational 
forces seconded by Member States—such violations can still be prosecuted by the 
contributing states.48 Indeed, states have a duty to ensure that they respect the 1949 





40 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 117. 
41 Greenwood, supra note 39, at 17. 
42 See, e.g., Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, Nov. 5, 1993, 
1748 U.N.T.S. 257 (the U.N. “shall conduct its operations in Rwanda with full respect for the principles 
and spirit of the general convention, applicable to the conduct of military personnel. These international 
conventions include the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocol of 8 
June 1977.”). See also The Status of Forces Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government 
of the Republic of South Sudan Concerning the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (SOFA), (adopted 
Aug. 8, 2011). 
43 UN Secretary-General, Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, U.N. 
Doc ST/ SGB/ 1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999). The Bulletin has been described as binding norms on U.N. 
personnel because of its nature as U.N. “internal law” and the obligations of U.N. stemming from 
customary international law. See Saura, supra note 19, at 497. 
44 Rep. of the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, U.N. Doc A/55/305; GAOR 55th Sess. (2000). 
45 See 31st Round Table on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law, Sanremo, Sept. 4-6, 
2008, The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Peace Operations, from Rejection to 
Acceptance, at 91 (by Daphna Shraga). 
46 Greenwood, supra note 39, at 15. 
47 See Peter F. Chapman, Ensuring Respect: United Nations Compliance with International Humanitarian 
Law, HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 17, no. 1, 3-11 (2009), http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/17/1chapman.pdf. 
See also U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal 
Oversight Services, 59th Session, U.N. Doc A/59/661 (2005); UNIFEM, Women, War and Peace: The 
Independent Experts’ Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peace 
Building (2002) (by Elisabeth Rehn & Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf,); Sex and the UN: when Peacemakers 
Become Predators, THE INDEPENDENT (Jan. 11, 2005), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/sex-and-the-un-when-peacemakers-become-predators- 
6155183.html; Int’l Peace Research Inst., Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeepers, Policy Brief 
10/2009 (2009) (by Suk Chun). 
48 Saarbrücken, supra note 39, at 695. 






even if they second their forces to the U.N.49 A member of peacekeeping forces would 
be, therefore, prosecuted before the courts of his state if he commits a violation of 
international humanitarian law.50 As a result, there is no problem in applying 
international humanitarian law in determining the legal status of traditional U.N. 
peacekeepers. 
 
A.  Peacekeepers Under International Humanitarian Law 
 
¶20  International humanitarian law provides a classification for all persons on the 
battlefield. Individuals in combat environments are either civilians or combatants. 
According to Article 50 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (AP I), a 
civilian is a person who belongs neither to the category of prisoners of war nor that of a 
member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict.51 Based on this definition, 
international humanitarian law may classify peacekeepers as civilians.52 
¶21  The status of peacekeepers as civilians under international humanitarian law carries 
with it certain protections. The prohibition against “feigning . . . protected status by the 
use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral or other states not 
parties to the conflict”53 represents one kind of that protection.54 In addition, the parties to 
an international armed conflict have a duty to respect and protect peacekeepers engaged 
in relief operations.55 In general, peacekeepers are civilians who deserve protection 
afforded by Articles 48, 50, 51, and 52 of the AP I. This means that any attack on them 
would be unlawful, and they would have to be granted the fundamental guarantees 
provided in Article 75 of the AP I if captured.56 Peacekeepers would also be protected in 
the context of non-international armed conflicts. Under Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, they would be regarded as “persons taking no active part in hostilities.” 
Such a status would make any attack on them illegal.57 
¶22  The status of peacekeepers as protected civilians may be regarded as a rule of 
customary international law. For example, Rule 33 of the Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Database prohibits attacking “personnel and objects involved in a 
peace-keeping mission . . . as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians 
and civilian objects under international humanitarian law[.]”58 The military manuals of 
many States also regard peacekeepers as civilians, such as those of the Netherlands59 and 
 
 
49 Greenwood, supra note 39, at 17. 
50 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 397 (2004). 
51 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 50, adopted 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 609 (entered into 
force Dec. 7,1978) [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
52 Alice Gadler, The Protection of Peacekeepers and International Criminal Law: Legal Challenges and 
Broader Protection, 11 GERMAN L.J. 585, 589 (2010). 
53 Additional Protocol I, supra note 51, at art. 37(1)(d). 
54 Greenwood, supra note 39, at 30. 
55 Id. at 31; See also Additional Protocol I, supra note 51, at arts. 69-71. 
56 Greenwood, supra note 39, at 31. 
57 Id. 
58 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [hereinafter ICRC], Customary IHL - Rule 33. Personnel and Objects 
Involved in a Peacekeeping Mission (2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/customary- 
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule33. 
59 ICRC, Customary IHL - Practice Relating to Rule 33. Personnel and Objects Involved in a Peacekeeping 






the U.K.60 Attacks against peacekeeping forces are crimes under legislation passed in the 
U.K.,61 the Netherlands,62 and Iraq.63 
¶23 In general, U.N. Member States do not readily accept categorizing members of 
their armed forces assigned to U.N. missions as combatants,64 since this would make their 
personnel legitimate military targets.65 For example, NATO Member States insisted that 
their pilots who bombed Bosnian Serb positions were U.N. experts, not combatants.66 
This would mean that these experts had the right to attack Bosnian Serbs, while the latter 
did not have the right to return fire.67 Going by this logic regarding the status of the 
pilots, retaliation on the part of the Bosnian Serb would in fact constitute an international 
crime under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.68 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, however, France changed its position when two of its pilots were 
shot down by Bosnian Serb forces, claiming that they should be given the protections of 
prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention, a status not afforded to civilians.69 
¶24  Civilian status is a two-sided coin under international humanitarian law. On one 
hand, civilians are protected from attacks during armed conflict. On the other, they are 
obligated not to directly participate in hostilities. Thus, treating peacekeepers as civilians 
entails an obligation not to directly participate in hostilities; otherwise they lose their 
protected status.70 However, this rule of international humanitarian law is in tension with 
the rules crafted specially for peacekeeping operations, as will be highlighted next. 
 
B.  Peacekeepers Under U.N. Documents 
 
¶25  As mentioned foregoing, there is debate on the applicability of international 
humanitarian law  to U.N. peacekeeping forces when they are engaged in armed 
conflicts.71 However, it is not clear whether international humanitarian law’s definitions 
of civilian and combatant are applicable to peacekeeping forces. In other words, while 
international humanitarian law is specific in categorizing persons on the battlefield as 
civilians or combatants, various U.N. documents suggest a different categorization for 
peacekeepers. Thus, it is an open question whether international humanitarian law assigns 
the appropriate status concerning peacekeepers and PMSC personnel in peacekeeping 
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operations. This part of the paper will now investigate peacekeeping rules established by 
the U.N. in order to compare them with the provisions of international humanitarian law. 
¶26 Two key U.N. documents concerning the legal status of peacekeepers are the  
Convention on Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and the Secretary- 
General’s Bulletin. The Convention establishes that those who take part in U.N. peace 
enforcement operations in accordance with Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter are 
combatants.72 Similarly, the Bulletin provides that members of both peace enforcement 
and peacekeeping operations are combatants when actively engaged in armed conflict.73 
The Bulletin classifies peacekeepers as combatants only when they directly participate in 
hostilities, whereas members of peace enforcement operations are classified as 
combatants even if they do not participate in hostilities.74 Thus, the distinction between 
civilian and combatant status for the members of U.N. peacekeeping forces hinges on 
their active engagement in armed conflict. 
¶27  Peacekeepers can actively engage in armed conflict in two situations. The first is 
personal self-defense, the second, defense of the mandate. 
¶28  Refraining from the use of force except in self-defense is one of the core principles 
of peacekeeping. The rules of engagement for every peacekeeping mission expressly state 
that the use of force is allowed only in self-defense.75 
¶29  The permission to use force in self-defense has been stretched, however, to include 
the use of force to defend the mandate.76 Self-defense, in this view, is interpreted broadly 
to include defense of others, and thus covers such third parties as civilians, convoys of 
humanitarian assistance,77 and safe areas.78 
¶30  As a result of this expanded conception of self-defense, peacekeeping forces have 
been deployed to many conflict areas where there were no operational cease-fires. For 
example, the mandate of the U.N. Mission in the Congo (ONUC) permitted the use of 
force, albeit as a last resort, to prevent civil war by arranging for a cease-fire, bringing all 
military operations to a halt, and preventing clashes.79 The U.N. Security Council’s 
authorizing ONUC to use force was controversial, raising questions about whether the 
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mission was peacekeeping or was instead the sort of peace enforcement operation 
traditionally authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.80 The ICJ stated, 
however, that the ONUC mandate’s use-of-force provisions did not make it a peace 
enforcement measure.81 Similarly, the reinforced U.N. mission in Sierra Leone 
represented a considerable turn toward what is called “robust peacekeeping.”82 
This mission started in 1998 with 70 observers.83 When armed groups breached the peace 
agreement, the Security Council decided to deploy over 11,000 troops authorized to use 
force both to defend its mandate and to protect civilians.84 The majority of U.N. 
peacekeeping missions since 2000 have included similar provisions.85 The U.N. Task 
Force in Somalia, established according to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, was 
authorized to use all necessary means to create a secure environment for 
humanitarian operations.86 
¶31  The content of these mandates makes it impossible to reconcile the status of 
peacekeepers under U.N. rules to the status accorded them under international 
humanitarian law. Under international humanitarian law, they are protected as civilians 
and consequently do not have the right to take participate in hostilities. Yet under 
peacekeeping rules, they are civilians who become combatants if they are actively 
engaged in armed conflict. Under international humanitarian law, self-defense does not 
constitute direct participation in hostilities and so does not result in losing the protected 
status of a civilian.87 Under peacekeeping rules, however, self-defense does transform 
peacekeepers from civilians into combatants. Finally, the main criterion for determining 
peacekeepers’ combatant status under peacekeeping rules is a “direct participation in 
hostilities,” while such a criterion is not decisive under international humanitarian law.88 
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III. LEGAL STATUS OF EMPLOYEES OF PMSCS 
  
  From the foregoing, it is clear that there is a difference between rules of 
international humanitarian law and peacekeeping in relation to the status of peacekeepers. 
Such differences may lead to even more ambiguity when PMSCs are used as 
peacekeepers. Generally speaking, PMSC personnel not directly participating in 
hostilities qualify as civilians.89 This part will flesh out how this status would be affected 
if they became involved in peacekeeping operations. Ultimately, the status of PMSC 
personnel may depend on the manner of their involvement in peacekeeping, that is, upon 
whether they are hired by a Member State and seconded to the U.N. or instead hired 
directly by the U.N. 
 
A.  Applicability of Mercenary Status 
 
¶33  As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to address the belief that PMSCs are 
nothing more than modern-day mercenaries.90 At a minimum, however, this view cannot 
be applied to PMSCs hired for use in U.N. peacekeeping operation. This is due to the 
narrowness of the internationally accepted definition of a “mercenary” as evidenced by 
both Article 47 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (AP I) 
and the U.N. Convention against Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries (U.N. Mercenary Convention). 
¶34  Article 47 of AP I defines a mercenary in terms of six criteria, all of which must be 
met before a person can be classified as a mercenary. Such a person must: 1) be recruited 
locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; 2) actually take part directly in the 
hostilities; 3) be motivated essentially by the desire for private gain and in fact be 
promised material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to 
combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of the party to the conflict 
by or on behalf of which that promise is made; 4) be neither a national of a party to the 
conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict; 5) not be a 
member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and 6) have not been sent by a state 
which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.91 The 
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U.N. Mercenary Convention expands these criteria to require that a mercenary be 
“ . . . [r]ecruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a concerted act of 
violence aimed at: . . . [o]verthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the 
constitutional order of a State; or . . . [u]ndermining the territorial integrity of a State.”92 
¶35  There are clearly provisions that cannot be applied to employees of PMSCs hired 
by the U.N. For example, when PMSCs are hired by the U.N., they cannot be said to be 
hired by a party to the conflict or to have been asked to take part in the conflict. As 
discussed, peacekeepers are not sent to participate in an armed conflict. A combatant 
must take direct part in hostilities in order to qualify as a mercenary, moreover. Yet what 
constitutes “direct participation in hostilities” lacks any internationally accepted 
definition, and cannot be applied to parties hired directly by the U.N. to take part in 
peacekeeping in any event: far from directly participating in hostilities, peacekeepers are 
not permitted to use force except in self-defense. Therefore, employees of PMSCs taking 
part in U.N. peacekeeping operations cannot be categorized as mercenaries under 
international law. 
 
B.  PMSCs Seconded to the U.N. by Member States 
 
¶36  The U.N. does not have a standing army or a police force.93 As such, U.N. missions 
are composed of armed forces seconded by Member States based on Security Council 
request. There is no obligation on Member States to respond to such requests, let alone to 
provide armed contingents of a specific number or kind. A Member State has the freedom 
to choose which kind of armed forces it can provide. 
¶37  A state may decide to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations by contracting 
with PMSCs either to represent its armed forces or to support a mission. The latter option 
is frequently employed by the U.S., for example. After the decision not to 
second federal police forces to international missions, the U.S. State Department hired 
PMSCs to provide police services to international peacekeeping operations.94 It has been 
suggested that, prior to 2004, “every US police officer taking part in U.N. Civilian 
Police . . . was in fact a DynCorp employee,” referring to DynCorp International, a 
private U.S. company.95 In 2003, the same company contracted with the State 
Department to perform services required for peacekeeping in Africa.96 During the 2004 
U.N. peacekeeping mission in Haiti, the State Department contracted with PAE 
Government Services, Inc., and the Homeland Security Corporation to support and 
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maintain the U.S. Civilian Police contribution to that mission.97 The question, therefore, 
is whether such use of private companies in peacekeeping changes the status of their 
employees as civilians. That is, would they be regarded as combatants belonging to the 
national armed forces of the seconding state? 
¶38  To answer this question, it must first be noted that a state may second private 
companies to participate in peacekeeping operations if these companies are incorporated 
into its national armed forces.  For such companies to be regarded as part of national 
armed forces, however, a number of legal requirements, established by international 
humanitarian law, must be fulfilled. A private company may be incorporated into the 
armed forces of a nation either on a de facto or de jure basis, in accordance with Article 4 
of the Third Geneva Convention and Article 43 of AP I.98 
¶39  A de facto incorporation into a nation’s armed forces can occur where a private 
company is treated as a “group” or “unit” in accordance with Article 43. This requires, 
inter alia, that the PMSC be subject to internal disciplinary controls that enforce 
compliance with the rules of international law applicable to armed conflict.99 
¶40  Treating a PMSC as a de facto representative of a state in U.N. peacekeeping 
operations is problematic, however. As adopted in the Third Geneva Convention, the de 
facto relationship is applicable only to international armed conflicts: under Article 43 of 
AP I and Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, a de facto relationship arises only 
when an armed group carries out combat functions to support one of the parties to an 
international armed conflict.100 At the same time, only states and national movements 
may be parties to an international armed conflict.101 The second article of each of the four 
Geneva conventions limits their applicability to “all cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties.” 
Yet as been noted repeatedly in this paper, peacekeepers are not sent to take part in an 
armed conflict. One of the most important principles of peacekeeping operations is that 
the use of force is prohibited except in cases of self-defense and defense of the mandate. 
Therefore, peacekeeping operations do not qualify as armed conflicts within the meaning 
of Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention. Moreover, the de facto relationship 
can arise only between an armed group and a party to the international armed conflict, 
i.e., either a state or a national movement. In peacekeeping, by contrast, a PMSC is 
seconded by a state to the U.N., which means that the relevant relationship is between a 
seconding state and an international organization. It is clear that this relationship does 
not satisfy what is required under international humanitarian law for it to be labeled as a 
de facto relationship. 
¶41 An additional problem arises from the fact that Article 4(A) (2) requires that such 
an armed group “belong to a party to the conflict.” This expression is interpreted to mean 
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that there must be some kind of link between an irregular armed group and a state.102 The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, for example, held that this 
link requires a state to exercise overall control over these groups.103 The peacekeeping 
contingent, by contrast, is regarded as a subsidiary organ of the U.N., which means that it 
would be under the command and control of that organization.104 Because the seconding 
state does not exercise command and control over a PMSC that 
accompanies its forces in a peacekeeping operation, that PMSC has not been incorporated 
into that state’s national armed forces on a de facto basis, as defined by international 
humanitarian law. 
¶42 Alternatively, there might be a de jure relationship between a PMSC and a state. 
Such a relationship comes about by the issuance of a domestic decree, statute, etc. that 
incorporates the PMSC into the national armed forces.105 A contract between a state and a 
PMSC is not enough to transform the PMSC’s staff into members of the national armed 
forces: there must be a more formal affiliation.106 There are very few examples of such 
incorporation. The staff of a South African company, Executive Outcomes, was 
incorporated into the armed forces of Sierra Leone during the civil war in 1995-96, and 
the personnel of a U.K. company, Sandline, were incorporated into the Papua New 
Guinea national armed forces as “special constables” in 1997.107 
¶43  This kind of de jure relationship is sanctioned by Article 4(A)(1) of the Third 
Geneva Convention. Under that article, prisoners of war can include ‘‘members of the 
armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps 
forming part of such armed forces.”108 By the terms of the article, the only criterion for a 
volunteer corps is that they “form . . . [a] part” of the armed forces. There is no specific 
and clear guidance, however, that can be used to determine whether a member of an 
armed group can be considered to be a member of the armed forces.109 Article 4(A)(1) 
sets out no requirements that a militia or volunteer corps must meet in order to be 
considered as “forming part” of the armed forces.110 Since international humanitarian law 
does not provide any guidance in this regard, any such requirements would have to be 
supplied by domestic law, which determines the structure and size of a state’s armed 
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forces.111 That is, the validity of a PMSC’s incorporation into the state’s armed forces 
sufficient to satisfy Article 4(A)(1) is determined solely by that state’s domestic law. The 
rules governing the de jure relationship are more applicable to PMSCs participating in 
U.N. peacekeeping operations. If a state incorporated a PMSC into its armed forces, then 
the latter can represent a state concerned in U.N. peacekeeping operations.  In that case, 
the PMSC would be dealt with as an agent of the state. Personnel of a private company 
seconded to U.N. peacekeeping missions would be regarded as combatants pursuant to 
the rules of international humanitarian law. Under the U.N. Secretary-General’s Bulletin, 
however, they would be considered civilians if they did not participate in armed conflict 
directly and combatants if they did.112 It does not seem that there would be a special legal 
issue in this regard, since personnel of a private company would be regarded as members 
of the armed forces of a state. 
 
C.  PMSCs Hired Directly by the U.N. 
 
¶44  The U.N. has relied upon PMSCs in various peacekeeping missions. Hiring PMSCs 
to carry out peacekeeping functions instead of relying on traditional U.N. forces was 
suggested for the first time in 1996 during the Rwandan Genocide. In light of the failure of 
U.N. forces to protect civilians, the U.N. High Commission for Refugees suggested that 
PMSCs be relied upon to separate belligerents from civilians in the Goma camps.113 In 
response to this suggestion, an offer was made by Executive Outcomes to create “security 
islands” by deploying 1500 of their personnel over a period of fourteen days — at a cost of 
$150 million. The U.N. rejected this offer due to a lack of agreement as to who should pay, 
and Member States subsequently offered to provide personnel to participate in the 
operation. The weaknesses and considerable costs of the U.N. operations in Rwanda when 
compared with the offer made by Executive Outcomes have led some to support the use of 
PMSCs. 114 Since the Security Council has the power to delegate the conduct of peace 
operation to regional organizations such as NATO,115 the European Union,116 and the 
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¶45  The question here is not whether the Security Council or General Assembly has the 
legal competence to delegate the conduct of peacekeeping mission to PMSCs.119 It is 
rather about the status of personnel of PMSCs contracted directly by the U.N. to perform 
peacekeeping operations. 
¶46 A PMSC used in peacekeeping may be regarded as an “agent” of the U.N. 
According to the ICJ in its advisory opinion in Reparation for injuries suffered in the 
service of the United Nations, the term “agent” can be used to refer to those who are 
used by the U.N. to carry out its functions. It stated that: 
 
The Court understands the word “agent” in the most liberal sense, 
that is to say, any person who, whether a paid official or not, and 
whether permanently employed or not, has been charged by an 
organ of the organization with carrying out, or helping to carry out, 
one of its functions—in short, any person through whom it acts.120 
 
¶47 Similarly, in its advisory opinion on the Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, the ICJ stated that 
“[i]n practice, according to the information supplied by the Secretary-General, the United 
Nations has had occasion to entrust missions — increasingly varied in nature — to 
persons not having the status of United Nations officials.”121 In the commentary on the 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations, the U.N. International 
Law Commission is explicit that the term “agent” does not refer only to ”officials but 
also to other persons acting for the United Nations on the basis of functions conferred by 
an organ of the organisation.”122 By these interpretations of what an “agent” is, a private 
company hired directly by the U.N. to participate in peacekeeping operations can be 
classified as an agent of the U.N. This would mean that the PMSC’s personnel would 
assume the legal status of peacekeepers. In other words, they would be civilians and have 
the privileges and immunities of U.N. personnel if not actively involved in armed 
conflict. They would also be considered combatants if they took direct part in hostilities. 
 
D.  Implications of the Legal Status of PMSC Peacekeepers Hired By the United Nations 
 
¶48  The conclusion that PMSC personnel hired by the U.N. to serve as peacekeepers 
would be civilians until they participated directly in hostilities, in which case they would 
be combatants, generates some legal issues worth considering. The majority of jurists 
believe that the personnel of PMSCs are civilians under the rules of international 
humanitarian law.123 And so long as PMSC personnel used in peacekeeping 
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did not take part in hostilities directly, they would continue to enjoy that status. If they 
were to take part in hostilities, however, they would have to lose their protected status as 
civilians and be considered unlawful combatants.124 Under the peacekeeping rules formed 
by various U.N. conventions and standard Status of Forces Agreements, however, the 
personnel of PMSCs used in peacekeeping would not face any of these consequences if 
they became actively involved in armed conflict: they would instead be regarded as 
combatants.125 That is, there is a tension between international humanitarian law on one 
hand and the patchwork of rules specific to peacekeeping on the other in this regard. 
¶49  It should be noted that the criterion for a peacekeeper’s status as a combatant is 
“direct participation in hostilities,” a criterion foreign to international humanitarian law. 
Combatant status under Article 43(2) of AP I and Article 4(A) of the Third Geneva 
Convention is determined by membership in the armed forces (other than medical 
personnel and chaplains) and membership in militias or volunteer corps forming part of 
such armed forces. The rights of combatants are conferred on members of organized 
armed groups that are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, have a 
fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry arms openly, and respect the laws 
and customs of war.126 Everyone else has the rights and protections of a civilian.127 Direct 
participation in hostilities is irrelevant to combatant or civilian status. A member of the 
armed forces is a combatant even if he or she does not take direct part in hostilities. For 
example, the Appeal Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia is clear that “members of the armed forces resting in their homes in the area 
of the conflict . . . remain combatants whether or not they are in combat or for the time 
being armed.”128 
¶50  Consequently, classifying PMSC personnel as combatants depending on their direct 
participation in hostilities would be a departure from the rules of international 
humanitarian law relating to the definition of combatants. One must certainly wonder 
why the staff of private companies would be unlawful combatants when hired by states to 
take direct part in hostilities, yet be lawful combatants if they actively engage in armed 
conflicts as U.N.-hired peacekeepers. Such individuals are not members of a national 
army, after all, but are instead private citizens working for private firms.129 
¶51  The only possible way for PMSC personnel to gain the status of combatants under 
international humanitarian law is through de facto or de jure association with a state’s 
armed forces, as discussed above, yet neither of these routes is possible when the PMSC 
is hired by the U.N. The de jure route requires enacting a law incorporating a PMSC into 
the national armed forces. Yet the U.N. has neither its own armed forces nor a legal 
system analogous to those of States. The de facto route is based upon a relationship 
between a PMSC and a party to the armed conflict. Yet the PMSC’s employer — the 
U.N. — is not a party to an armed conflict in peacekeeping operations. 
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¶52  These remarks concerning the legal status of PMSC personnel hired by the U.N. for 
peacekeeping operations has important practical corollaries. The Security Council 
authorizes peacekeepers, and thus PMSCs employed in peacekeeping, to use force either 
to defend themselves or to defend the mandate. In both of these situations, personnel of 
PMSCs would be regarded as combatants under peacekeeping rules. The use of force in 
other situations would affect their legal status. It was reported, for example, that DSL, a 
U.K.-based PMSC, used deadly force during its operation to support the U.N. Mission in 
Angola, and that DynCorp did the same in East Timor.130 Where PMSC conduct is 
illegal, it is debatable whether the same rules of peacekeeping will apply. The legality of 
the use of force by PMSCs used in peacekeeping operation, after all, is the reason for 
classifying them as combatants rather than as civilians. By this same logic, however, the 
use of force not authorized by the Security Council should not entitle them to be regarded 
as lawful combatants. They would instead be civilians participating in hostilities, and 
under international humanitarian law such civilians may face a variety of legal 
consequences ranging from prosecution to loss of protection and categorization as 
legitimate military targets. 
¶53  A further observation is necessary with regard to according the privileges and 
immunities of U.N. personnel to PMSC peacekeepers. The use of a PMSC in U.N. 
peacekeeping affords its employees the privileges and immunities of the agents and 
personnel of the U.N.131 This can lead to a tension between the Secretary-General’s 
Bulletin and the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel.132 Employees of PMSCs would be classified as combatants according to the 
Secretary-General’s Bulletin, which acknowledges that U.N. forces actively engaged in 
armed conflict are combatants.133 At the same time, Article 9 of the Convention on the 
Safety of United Nations and Associate Personnel makes it a crime to attack U.N. 
personnel and obliges Member States to exercise jurisdictions over such crimes.134 This 
contrasts with principles of international humanitarian law, under which attacks 
committed by combatants against other combatants are not crimes.135 
¶54  Crucially, while peacekeepers are immune from prosecution in the courts of the 
host state, this immunity is offset by requirement that the State sending peacekeepers 
itself “exercise jurisdiction with respect to crimes or offences which may be committed 
by its military personnel serving with [the United Nations peace-keeping operation].”136 
The Model Status of Force Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations (SOFA) provides 
that the States contributing to the peacekeeping mission must prosecute members of their 
militaries for crimes committed in the territory of the host State.137 
¶55  In the case of a PMSC hired directly by the U.N., however, it is not easy to provide 
for the same sort of jurisdiction. The state where the PMSC is registered may not have 
jurisdiction over its employees: such companies recruit individuals from various 
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nationalities. For example, U.S.-based Blackwater employed 150 Chileans to work in 
Iraq.138 At the same time, the U.N. cannot exercise jurisdiction over such crimes, since it 
does not have the same criminal justice system as other states. This jurisdictional 
challenge might be overcome by amending SOFA to cover this kind of situation. Such an 
amendment should either not extend the immunity granted to peacekeepers to PMSC 
personnel, in which case the receiving state would have jurisdiction over them, or confer 
that jurisdiction on the home state of the company or the state of which the perpetrator is 
a national. 
¶56  The tension between international humanitarian law and the rules specific to 
peacekeeping therefore has a greater significance when dealing with PMSCs employed 
directly by the U.N. than when concerning traditional peacekeeping forces. The right to 
engage in hostilities without becoming a legitimate military target in turn and immunity 
from local prosecution enjoyed by peacekeepers — a constellation of privileges unknown 
to international humanitarian law — is counterbalanced by a seconding state’s obligation 
to hold its peacekeeping forces to account. Yet PMSCs hired by the U.N. would enjoy 
privileges unknown to international humanitarian law without any such counterbalancing 
obligations. And in that case, one might wonder why the rules specific to peacekeeping 





¶57  The legal status of the personnel of PMSCs used in U.N. peacekeeping operations 
under peacekeeping rules differs from their status under international humanitarian law. 
Under the latter, they are regarded as civilians, forbidden from taking part in hostilities 
lest they lose their protected status and face prosecution. However, their status would be 
completely different if they were used in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Initially, they 
would be considered civilians if they abstained from direct participation in hostilities. If 
they engaged actively in armed conflict, however, their protected status as civilians 
would be suspended for the time being and they would be regarded as combatants. 
¶58  While many international documents have decided in favor of applying 
international humanitarian law to U.N. peacekeeping forces, it seems that the entire body 
of that law is not readily applied in the peacekeeping context. This would mean that the 
definitions of combatant and civilian under international humanitarian law would not be 
applicable to PMSCs used in peacekeeping. However, the specific rules applicable to 
peacekeepers — such as rules governing the means and methods of warfare — seem to 
represent the reaction of the U.N. to violations committed by these personnel. In this 
regard, the personnel of PMSCs used in peacekeeping may have two statuses. They are 
civilians if they are not involved directly in armed conflict and combatants if they are. 
However, they may be regarded as unlawful combatants if they use illegal force. This 
conclusion follows from a consideration of international humanitarian law regarding 
civilians, rather than the rules specific to peacekeepers. In this regard, the relationship 
between international humanitarian law and the rules specific to peacekeeping is one of 
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compromise. This may mean that both laws can apply depending on the circumstances of 
the case or situation. 
